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It is common knowledge that Wittgenstein cannot be called 
fundamentally a religious writer. All the same, he did not 
dismiss the reality 'religion' as nonsense. It is opined here 
that, Wittgenstein was very consistent in his references to 
it. We strongly claim that religion was a subject of his 
philosophical preoccupation positioned among his general 
striking similes, arresting moments and connections of his 
general methods. Religion gained occasional and/or 
scattered referencing in his works (e.g. the notes of 1938, 
the positioning of religion and/or theology as grammar in 
the 'Philosophical Investigations (PI: 373; p.283), Zettel 
and the later work 'Culture and Value). Despite the above, 
we have to agree, with Wittgenstein, that his poetic 
compositions are to be understood and seen in consistent 
connections (PI: 122) even when they look disconnected. 
One therefore, has every ground to connect 'religion' with: 
(a) The ways of looking at things (cf. PI: 144);  
(b) As an aspect of presenting things in plain view (cf. PI : 89); 
(c) As part of the state of affairs we should not overlook 
(cf. PI: 89).  
In order to avoid every misunderstanding, Wittgenstein 
presents a methodology that guarantees active and 
practical understanding of this social physics, which he 
calls the world. At the same time his work provides an 
understanding of the world that allows us to 'go on' with or 
without much confusion within the given social practice. 
We may not forget that Wittgenstein's achievement gives 
us the disposition and toolbox with which we have to 
review our human behavior as connected with the totality 
of the world and the facts of the state of affairs (cf. 
Tractatus: 1-1.2). In the views of Wittgenstein, human 
behavior is made out of sensible follower-ship of sociality. 
This is only possible through the stances of what we have 
called in this paper 'worldhood'. This paper posits that 
even the question of religion can be answered with 
Wittgenstein's worldhood conception. This is possible 
especially when we try to see facts of being-in-the-world 
through the ability to make use of the phenomenon of the 
'reminders' (cf. PI: 127) and the reality of living our lives in 
the practice of everyday language-mental-state and 
reservoir. To 'go on' into the background of Wittgenstein's 
worldhood experiment, we would like to inform ourselves 
about the language-entwined practice of the concept. It 
was Sapir (1929: 207) who once said that:  
"Human beings do not live in the objective world alone... 
but are very much at the mercy of the particular lan-
guage which has become the medium of expression for 
their society... The fact of the matter is that the real 
world is to a large extent unconsciously built upon the 
language habits of the group... We see and hear and 
otherwise experience very largely as we do because the 
language habits of our community predispose certain 
choices of interpretation". 
The above position takes us now to the issues of Wittgen-
stein's concept of world, and the implied 'worldhood'. The 
first reminder is that the Wittgensteinian world and its 
leitmotif 'worldhood' are language-games tested in social 
practice and rules of sociality- since 'ubi societas ibi jus'. 
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It is the language (I use) that limits the world since 'the limit 
of my language becomes the limit of my world' (Tractatus: 
5.6; 5.62; 5.621; 5.632). The world is this world made 
manifest through the facts of the language I understand 
and this world and my life are one and I am therefore my 
world -the microcosm. To expand this issue more, King 
(1963:73) states that: 
"The world is not a thing, but man himself is worldish: he 
is, at the bottom of his being, world disclosing, and world 
forming." 
The Wittgensteinian world is that which can be mirrored in 
and through language. Wittgenstein's expression of the 
'signal', 'understanding' and the conviction and/or 
knowledge that 'one knows he/she can go on' is a 
worldhood followable responsibility indicative of a situated 
and socially conducted and/or constituted form of life. 
Worldhood is the after-effect of environmentality, historic-
ity, cooperative engagement, relationship and the interplay 
of activity commonly shared in the family (speech 
community) focus. 'The world is all that is the case' (cf. 
Tractatus: 1). For Wittgenstein worldhood is practically 
onto-linguistic. Sefler (1974:188f) in this case says that: 
"Language and the world are two sides of the same 
reality. The world I know is known inseparably from the 
language I use. One cannot split the two and discuss 
them in isolation without some literal misrepresentation... 
An investigation of the structure of language is at the 
same time an investigation of the formal aspects of the 
world. To give the essence of propositions means to 
give the essence ... of the world". 
Worldhood, therefore, is ontolinguistic sui generis. This is 
what Heidegger noted as the 'Being of Entities' which 
according his 'Dasein's' conception belongs essentially to 
a world. Thus an understanding of Dasein pertains with 
entities that become accessible within the world. Under 
this ontolinguistic approach, we have to emphasize that 
man-hood is world-hood and worldhood must be found 
within the toolbox of language. Our talks, says Wittgen-
stein, get their meaning from our proceedings and we 
cannot use language to get out of language. We can only 
find a 'world-about-ness' inside our own language forms of 
life. Our worldhood is the state of affairs in a landscape of 
grammatical and social geography. Worldhood is not a 
theoretical stance but a forum for acute practice. It is the 
practice of 'going on' with one another in a social setting. 
We are in the world of 'rule follow-able fellowship'. It is an 
interactive moment of participation in even a possible blind 
obedience to the rule (cf. PI: 219). Obeying the set rules 
means pure practice (cf. PI: 202) jointly regulated through 
the language 'use'.  





One important question that now follows the above issue is 
that of the Wittgensteinian balance between language as a 
social nature and that of language as an individual nature. 
The so-called 'private language argument' (PI: 244-272, 
especially 256) strikes this balance question. Under this 
balance we hereby present our concept of competence 
and performance in this paper. We can understand 
Wittgenstein's position that language is a 'sharable game' 
that is made manifest in praxis and expression, acquaint-
ance and action. We understand in this regard that a 
language user can name and/or express, stricto sensu, 
sense data he/she is acquainted with since one can not 
use language to get out of language. The sharp implication 
here is that language on the individual nature can, to some 
extent, be considered 'private' and this is the competence 
sphere and on the social nature, language must be 'public' 
as to contain the performance sphere. From this frame-
work we shall be looking at language competence and 
performance as communicative act within the 'rule' of the 
game.  
"Communicative competence...can be seen as the 
innate knowledge which permits the user of a language to 
create and comprehend utterances, to issue the communi-
cative tokens of speech acts, in which language operates 
as an open system in constant interaction with its environ-
ment ... A specification of communicative competence can 
be recognized as an attempt to define not only how a user 
is able to judge grammatically but also how he is able to 
recognize what is acceptable as a speech act in a social 
situation" (Bell 1983:207). 
Communicative competence means the individual innate 
disposition, capacity and basic qualification in comprehen-
sive functionality of the given socially constituted symbolic 
forms. It is the mastery of an ideal speech situation (cf. 
Habermas 1970:138). Performance on the other hand, is 
the practical and/or 'acting out' of the said competence. 
This includes the appropriated 'doing of the language'. In 
this case, the performing individual is no longer talking 
about the knowledge of the language but doing the 
language within the following outfit:  
Language -  
Setting and scene,  (S) 
Participation,   (P) 
Ends,    (E) 
Act sequence,   (A) 
Key,    (K) 
Instrumentalities,    (I) 
Norms,    (N) 
Genres    (G) 
On the grounds of the above, Hymes (1972:269-293) 
developed the acronym "speaking". This is performance 
clearly identified. In the views of Chomsky(1965:10-15), for 
example, competence and performance depend on the 
following issues:  
The formal framework with respect to the norms of the 
particular language and culture; 
The extent of feasibility for immediate comprehension; 
The appropriate performance factors; 
The transformational and/or generative possibilities of 
doing through the language. 
In the light of the above, we can once more look at 
Wittgenstein's worldhood conception from his language/ 
linguistic cognitive aspirations. The world and language 
are the comprehensive data for being-in-the-world. Puhl 
(1994:340) says to this effect that: 
"Wittgenstein stresses the dispositional character of self-
ascriptions of intentional states. Their truth seems to be 
dependent on what the subject in question later does 
and says... What counts as fulfillment of an intentional 
state seems to be constituted by the way speakers 
react, not what is 'in their heads'".  
What really matters for Wittgenstein is the language 'use' 
(Okonkwo 2003:111-129) and its socio-linguistic content 
(Okonkwo 2002: 451-467) imbued in action and reaction of 
sharable (religious) 'belief' practices and acquaintances. 
When Wittgenstein says 'I can go on', there are two 
serious options to underline. One is that the expression 'I' 
implies the individual act of competence, and, two the 
applied 'can go on' is indicative of the complexities of 
performance since 'obeying a rule is a practice' (cf. PI: 
202).  
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What we have termed 'worldhood' stands as the practice, 
which paves the way to the possibilities of creating ways of 
'going on' to religion. The issue here is not directed 
towards the phenomenon called religion but, as Wittgen-
stein might say, towards the possibilities of this phenome-
non (cf. PI: 90). At the same time we may not forget that 
we must 'let the use of words teach us their meaning' (PI: 
p.220e). Religion and religious beliefs (practices) fall within 
the phenomena of worldhood complexities. But at the 
same time when we read from the Tractatus (6.432) 'God 
does not reveal himself in the world' there seems to be a 
contradiction to the major issue of this paper. There is no 
doubt that Wittgenstein does not speak about religion and 
religious belief in vacuo. Religion and religious belief are 
words that teach 'meaning'. They are conceptual equip-
ments dealing with the world and also determining worldish 
roles played within the landscape of experience and 
worldview. In this context one can conveniently assert that 
there is a 'use' and a 'need' for religious language. Religion 
and religious belief belong to everyday - ordinary language 
of the 'riddle of life in the world'. Tractatus (6.5) tells us that 
when an answer cannot be put into words, neither can the 
question about the issue be put into words. The riddle in 
this case does not exist. If a question can be framed at all 
about religion and religious belief, it is also very possible to 
answer it. The answer to the questions about religion and 
beliefs is possibly answerable through the worldview 
landscape, sharable in language (game) and/or everyday 
practice. Religion is not definable outside the worldhood 
conception. It is (language) grammar that tells about the 
essence of a thing or phenomenon (PI: 371; 373). Lan-
guage has both connotative and denotative reminders. As 
a caveat, we have to say that every high-tension of 
religious 'mythicalness' can only be downloaded by the 
low-tension of worldhood (cf. Zettel: 717). 





The site of all religious practices (knowledge and beliefs) 
and all the 'mythicalness' involved gain existence and 
manifestation in the world of language where games are 
open to interaction (PI: 584). Competence and perform-
ance in worldhood means that religious belief is a 
contextual, sharable and knowledgeable experience. We 
can remember that Wittgenstein (Zettel: 144) says that 
'how words are understood is not told by words alone' but 
by the context of application we can understand the 
meaning of the word. Religious knowledge (belief) belongs 
to the ethics and/or ethos of worldhood as 'modus cum 
munus' of seeing the world aright (cf. Tractatus: 6.521; 
654). It is in this case certain that it is the worldhood 
competence and performance (mundus sensibilis) that 
make our religious knowledge (belief) complete. We may 
not forget that the religious subject (the microcosm) knows 
his religious world and the language thereof. It will at the 
same time be quite wrong to see religion as an aspect of 
the problem of solipsism (cf.Schulte 2001:193-212). We 
may conclude with Schoenbaumsfeld (2001:190) that: 
"Der Glaube ist die Säule der religiösen Lebensform... 
Rüttelt man daran, zerstört man ein ganzes Weltbild und 
nicht bloß eine einzelne Überzeugung". 
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